Left: The author just before taking Type R2.2 Car No. 2131 back to Max-Weber-Platz from Grünwald, 10.02.2004 - My final duty on the Munich system....... and below: it's all over!
Munich's Trams - A brief history.........
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Left: The author just before taking Type R2.2 Car No. 2131 back to Max-Weber-Platz from Grünwald, 10.02.2004 - My final duty on the Munich system....... and below: it's all over! |
Recently (October 2001), Munich's tramway system celebrated its 125th anniversary. A cavalcade of historical and modern cars snaked its way through the tight curves of the inner-city ring route, passing the thousands lining the pavements, who had turned out to watch the spectacle. A happy occasion, but one that, had the politicians of the time had their way, would never have happened.
As the 1970's gave way to the 80's, the city's planners were proud to proclaim that the underground "U-Bahn" was the way to get about in future, with a comprehensive bus service bringing the passengers to their nearest station. Trams were deemed to be relics of the past, however much they were a traditional part of the Munich way of life and were to be abolished completely, by the turn of the Century.
The repercussions of this policy are still being felt today, as the city attempts to catch up on all the lack of investment that followed the decision to abandon the tramway system.
Built on behalf of the city by the Belgian engineer, Edouard Otlet, Munich’s first tramway opened on 21st October, 1876. The route, 2,8km (1 ¾ miles) long, ran between Promenadeplatz in the city centre and the corner of Nymphenburger Straße / Maillinger Straße, where today’s U-Bahn station “Maillinger Straße” (U1) is situated. Cars were horse-drawn.
During the following two years, Otlet was able to complete construction of extensions to the system, as agreed with the city council, with the system’s operator being the foreign company headed by its French director, Treize-Dreys.
The operating company was, however, not popular within the city. On 25th August 1882, the “Münchener Trambahn AG” assumed control of the system, now consisting of three routes.
The network was then further extended in two stages, 1882-83 and 1888-97, with a total of 40km (25 miles) of permanent way hosting the nine routes, of which 5.72km (3½ miles) were still single-track operated.
As the 19th Century drew to a close, electrical-powered cars began to replace horse-drawn and steam-powered vehicles. In June 1895 the first test runs over a route between Färbergraben and Isartalbahnhof took place, without passengers, initially, followed shortly afterwards by a mixed service of 4 electrical and 4 horse-drawn units. By 27th June 1895, approval had finally been given for all electrical operation of the route.
In the same year, 1895, the city council revealed plans for a future system of of "diagonal, (River) Isar-parallel and ring-road" routes.
By August 1900, electrification of all central routes had been completed. Twelve years later, the planned network was completed.
An interesting historical footnote is that just before the outbreak of World War 1, a conversion to trolleybuses was briefly considered, as these were calculated to be cheaper to run over less well frequented routes. Nothing ever came of the idea, as rows over the financing of construction of the first route could not be settled.
After the breakout of the War, construction of new tramway routes was limited to a short extension to Freimann-Süd (1917).
The Armistice in November 1918 and the subsequent Treaty of Versailles, heralded the outbreak of revolutionary political anarchy in Germany. Munich itself became a communist "Räterepublik" in April 1919, only for this to be quashed in a counter-revolution, a month later, by troops of the "Freikorps". Amid the chaos in Munich, a veteran of the War, one Adolf Hitler, was able to establish the beginnings of the National Socialist Party. When Hitler tried to seize power by force in 1923, his "March to Berlin" only got as far as Odeonsplatz, before it was bloodily suppressed by state police. It would be ten more years before Hitler eventually did come to power, legally, and unleash the terror of the Third Reich.
Meantime, despite the severe economic hardships, resulting in no small part from the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the reparations it demanded, modest progress towards the expansion of the tramway network continued. Four new routes were opened between 1919 - 21. Further extensions followed in the period 1925-30.
After
that, apart
from two small extensions along Donnersbergerstraße (1934) and Westendstraße
(1937), no further expansion to the network was made again until 1956. By the
outbreak of the Second World War in September, 1939, Munich’s tramway network
had expanded to 118.8km (73¼ miles), catering for 28 routes.
Despite defeat in the First World War, Munich’s buildings and transport infrastructure were not particularly affected, the main problems arising from having to cope with the severe economic hardships that followed. This, however, was not the case in the next War. As the so-called “Capital City of the Movement”, Munich was a prime target for Allied bombers and suffered great structural damage. As the dust settled on the ruins of Nazi Germany in May 1945, the first efforts at restoring public transport were made. After initial repairs, the post-war tramway system had been reduced to 91km (56½ miles).
Despite the austerity, the city was able to slowly reopen most routes, but with some notable exceptions, including the principle north-south route, which ran through the very heart of Munich, over Marienplatz and Sendlinger Straße. This route was destroyed in a bombing raid on the morning of 5th November 1944. The points at the junction with the inner-city ring at Odeonsplatz were removed in October 1948 and the tracks finally dismantled in 1951/52. Today, this route is served by the underground lines "U3" and "U6".
Shortages of cars and materials were a constant problem during the immediate post-war period, but by the early 1950's, as the seeds of the German "Wirtschaftswunder" were beginning to be sown, the city transport department, having restored the network (almost) to its pre-war status, slowly began to plan for the future.
The first prototypes of the Type-M car were revealed; a tram that probably, more than any other car type, came to symbolise Munich trams. Plans were put forward for extensions to the network and the mood in general, was one in favour of modernisation and improvement, responding to the ever increasing transport demands of a, by now, rapidly growing city. There was, however, at this time, no hint of what was to follow in terms of how the tramway would fit, or, rather, was not meant to fit into passenger transport concepts for the latter part of the Century.
By the end of 1964, Munich's tramway network had expanded to its maximum extent. 21 services were working over a total of 134.6 route-km (83½ route miles). In line with the modernising mood of the late 1950's and early 1960's, new routes were constructed over reserved track with a broader loading guage for speedy running. Following the success of the "M-Wagen", the next generation of tramcar, the Type-P ("P-Wagen") was specifically designed to serve these faster routes within the "Stadtbahn" concept. Options for creating underpasses at busy road junctions and tunnels through the city centre for the trams were considered. However, in the very same year that the tramways were extended to their greatest ever length of passenger routes, the fateful decision was made in favour of a full blown underground train system, at the expense of the "Stadtbahn" idea.
From this point onwards, the tramways were placed on a downward spiral of reduced investment and closures. Despite the decision in favour of the "U-Bahn", several new routes did open, the last of which was the extension to Neuperlach Zentrum, completed in September 1973. This particular route survived only seven years. Even as it was being built, the decision to extend the U-Bahn to Neuperlach, meant that the tram route was a white elephant, before a single passenger had used it. The transport department opted to open the route merely an interim measure, with closure upon completion of the "U-Bahn" route always being the plan.
In April, 1966, Munich was picked to host the 1972 Olympic Games. More than any other factor, at the time, this gave impetus to the construction and planning for further extensions to the underground system. The tramways on the other hand, were beginning to be perceived by the city's political leaders and the transport department's technical directors alike, as out-dated and unsuitable to cope with the modern public transport demands.
Drastic rationalisation was the inevitable consequence, with cars being converted to one-man operation, large sections of the network being abandoned and the number of depots reduced.
The closure of most routes during this period was as a result of a new, parallel underground line being opened. The state of Bavaria pays a subsidy to transport operators, tied to respective routes. The subsidy is only paid for one mode of transport. If a "U-Bahn" line is deemed to be geographically virtually identical with that of a tramway, then no subsidy will be paid for the tram route. This invariably makes the tramway economically unviable and closure is the result.
The mid 1970's attitude towards the tramway was that by the end of the Century, it would be abandoned completely in favour of an integrated bus / underground system. Many local politicians, notably from the conservative CSU, began to voice strongly anti-tram opinions. Their view was that because of their "flexibility", buses alone were suitable to cover passenger transport demand beyond the catchment areas of underground stations. If ever confronted with arguments about the larger carrying capacity and general environmental-friendliness of the trams, many CSU politicians would, for example, refer to the possibilities of battery-powered buses.
Just why the CSU in Munich has developed such an aversion to the tramway, remains unclear. As a party, they are, possibly, more susceptible to lobbying by the automobile and omnibus industries. It is also noticeable that, with populist slogans, they are often the first to, seemingly, stand up for the rights of the poor motorist who is often held up by slow moving trams, blocking his way as he speeds through the city.
Nevertheless, politicians from all sides were involved with the decisions which led to the policy of eventual total abandonment of the system. At management level within the transport department, the favoured option was also very much in favour of complete elimination of trams.
The CSU's victory in the local elections in 1978 saw the beginning of the darkest period in the Munich tramway system since the end of the War. In 1979, aware of growing public support for the retention of the tramway system, mayor, Erich Kiesl and the CSU refused to follow the recommendation of Director of Public Works, Peter Engelbrecht, for complete abandonment of the tramway. Together with the opposition parties SPD and FDP, it was decided to retain the trams pending a full policy decision, at a later date.
The future of the tramway was, at least, for the first time since the late 1960's, open to debate. This, however, did not alter the transport department's approach and the running down of the system continued. Investment was accordingly kept at a minimum.
In December 1982, the regional transport executive, MVV and the city's public works department, presented their "Public Transport 2000 Concept". A combined tram and bus network for 1995 (i.e. taking into account underground routes that would be open by that time) was compared with a network served by buses alone. All parallel routes were eliminated and only three tram routes would remain. It was calculated that including the trams would result in 20 million DM extra in running costs. The report therefore recommended complete abandonment of the tramway.
The report, due to its one-sidedness and proven inaccuracies in, for example, the calculation of pollutant emission levels for buses, was rejected by Munich City Council. It was decided to commission a further, independent report before making a final decision.
This however, did not stop Erich Kiesl and the CSU from embarking on a course of closure by stealth. On 15th December, 1982, they approved the biggest abandonment of routes in the history of the Munich tramway system. In total, 18.6km (11½ miles) of routes were closed; more to the point, without any obvious need to do so (e.g. because of the opening of new underground lines). Without doubt, the intention was to place the city before a fait accompli, cynically preempting any final policy decision on the future of the trams.
If, with its attention focused on things like the 1972 Olympic Games, or the World Cup Finals, also held in Munich, in 1974, public awareness of closures made in the 1960's and 70's was minimal, then the mood following these latest closures was very different. Voices speaking out in favour of retaining and modernising the trams became louder and the first real signs of resistance began to appear from many quarters. Environmental groups, passenger organisations, tram-enthusiast associations and many others all started to apply political pressure. This culminated in the City Council's decision, in February 1984, prohibiting the further dismantling of permanent way and overhead cables until a final policy decision had been made.
During the election campaign for the Mayor of Munich in 1984, the future of the trams was a central theme. SPD, FDP and the Green Party all declared themselves in favour of retaining the system. In the election, the Social Democrat, Georg Kronawitter, achieved a clear majority over the CSU's Erich Kiesl.
As one of his first acts, the new Mayor reopened the route from Harras to Westfriedhof (Tram No. 26). This however, proved to be more of a symbolic act than long-term policy, as the route was again closed, this time permanently, in May 1993.
The change of power in the town hall, nevertheless brought about a fundamental change in the city's approach to transport policy. Following the publication of the commissioned, independent report in 1985, which recommended the retention of trams. It proposed a tramway system which catered for tangential passenger movements, with the underground system catering for radial journeys between the city centre and the outer suburbs. New routes were envisaged to complete an outer ring and thus considerably shorten many point to point journeys.
Despite the initial optimism following Kronawitter's election, progress in reversing the neglect of the past two decades was slow. The CSU continued its vehement opposition to anything related to investment in the tramways. Parts of the local press were convinced that Munich "could not afford the luxury" of new tram routes.
In November 1989, the recommendations of the "Integrated Public Transport Plan ... for Munich" were brought before the City Council. The CSU criticised the level of investment required: 481 million DM. The transport department also attempted to reverse the trend and spoke out in favour of a "cheaper", bus-only network.
It was only in 1990, after the economic soundness of a mixed bus / tram system was finally proven, that the Munich CSU abandoned its resistance. In January 1991, the Integrated Transport Plan was, thus, unanimously approved.
In its implementation, the Integrated Transport Plan required the closure of a few more routes. In 1991, the route to Fürstenried from Harras (Tram No.16) was replaced by the extended underground line, "U3". Two years later, the remaining route in the south-west of the city, reopened only ten years earlier, from Westendstraße to Lorettoplatz, via Harras was also abandoned, judged to be uneconomical. Later in the same year, 1993, the routes from Scheidplatz to Hasenbergl and Scheidplatz to Harthof were closed, as the "U2" was extended to Hasenbergl and, eventually, Feldmoching. The system had now shrunk to just 64.7km (40 miles).
Following these closures, the first new, or restored routes were constructed between 1993 and 1997. The success of these routes leave no room for doubt. The reactivated northern part of route No. 17 from Hauptbahnhof to Romanplatz was expected to be used by 11000 passengers daily. After opening the route had to cope with 14000 passengers daily and now, on weekdays, is augmented by the No. 16, offering a frequency of 5 minutes.
Not only are the construction of new routes envisaged, an important part of the Integrated Transport Plan is the conversion of traffic signals to tram-priority. This allows trams to influence traffic signals electronically, causing them to switch to red for other vehicles and allow the tram to pass without having to stop. The redesign of stops, placing them, where possible, beyond traffic junctions, rather than before them is also designed to shorten journey times and, ultimately cut costs, as less cars are required to operate the route.
If the prospects for the tramway never seemed rosier a couple of years ago, dark clouds have once again began to appear on the horizon. An important part of the outer ring concept, detailed in the Integrated Transport Plan is the building of a short, new route between Tivolistraße and Elisabethplatz. The 2.2km (just over 1¼ miles) would pass through one of Munich's most famous of parks, the "Englischer Garten".
If, initially, the CSU were part of the unanimous decision to adopt the Integrated Transport Plan, they have played an instrumental part in obstructing the construction of this line.
Planning procedures in Germany, as in most places, are long, costly and drawn out affairs, especially involving construction of new lines , as opposed to restoring previously abandoned routes. Part of the procedures involve submitting the final plans to the CSU-dominated Upper Bavarian regional council, before work can begin. Preceding this, several stages of public consultation with suburban council bodies and other local government bodies have to be passed, as well as actual plans being prepared in relation to the works themselves.
Another element in this particular equation is the fact that the legal owners of the "Englisher Garten" is the Bavarian State, ruled with an absolute majority and likely to remain so, by the CSU. Before embarking on any expensive planning for the new route, the city administration, sensibly, thought it prudent to first consult with the Bavarian finance minister, Dr. Georg von Waldenfels, within whose portfolio the administration of parks and gardens fell. On 13th May, 1994, von Waldenfels signalled his agreement to the building of the line.
Thus the wheels of the planning procedures were finally set in motion. However, as the public consultation stage was reached, the Munich CSU embarked upon its campaign to stop the project. They argued that "ugly" modern trams with hard contours and the attendant, obtrusive overhead cables, have no place among the "soft, idyllic and picturesque" outlines of the park. The party's veteran hard-liner, Dr. Peter Gauweiler contrasted the "millions" being pumped into the project with an alleged lack of investment in housing and social welfare. With the SPD and Green Party coalition remaining just as deeply committed to the project, it was inevitable that it would become part of the next local election campaign.
In the meantime, the new finance minister, Dr. Kurt Faltlhauser, in contradiction of his predecessor, announced on 11th May, 1999, that he would never agree to the building of the line. Christian Ude (SPD), who succeeded Georg Kronawitter as mayor in Munich, has remained steadfastly behind the project and promptly accused the CSU of "breaking their word".
Despite Faltlhauser's announcement, the planning procedures were all completed and submitted for final approval by the regional authority in 2001. True to Faltlhauser's word, permission for building the line was not given. Shortly afterwards, the transport department, or rather company (since privatisation in 100% ownership of the City Council), with the Mayor's backing, then lodged an appeal to the Bavarian State Administration Court. This is the current status and it will be interesting to see what eventually transpires.
The city transport company's other current project is the building of a new line in the north of the city, between Münchener Freiheit and Funkkaserne West. Beyond this, plans still exist for further extensions to St. Emmeram and a return, albeit via Fürsterieder Straße, to Lorettoplatz and Aidenbachstraße (adjacent to Ratzingerplatz, once on the old route to Fürstenried). Whether these plans are actually realised, now that the euphoria of the tram-renaissance has died down, remains to be seen.
Whatever the outcome, trams will, thankfully, be around in Munich for quite some time yet.
Munich, January 2002